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A. A PROGRAM MANAGER’S PURPOSE 
A program manager (PM) within the Department of Defense (DOD) is an 
individual charged with delivering effective, affordable, and supportable systems to the 
Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen (Warfighters) of the U.S. military as expeditiously 
as possible. A PM supports the Warfighter’s needs by balancing the factors affecting 
cost, schedule, and performance throughout phases of a system’s life cycle. The PM is 
the consistent focal point for the design, development, production, testing, fielding, 
operation, support, and disposal of a particular system. A PM works with key 
stakeholders, typically within an integrated product team (IPT) construct, in order to 
address the myriad issues associated with a particular system’s progression from the 
“cradle” to “grave.” Thus, a PM is responsible for the entire life cycle of a specific 
program, as defined in the DOD acquisition process in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Defense Acquisition Process. Source: Department of Defense 
(2015a) 
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B. A PM’S AUTHORITY 
PMs derive their authority and commitment to a system’s life cycle from the 
DOD 5000 series of documents and the acquisition chain of command. The formal 
issuing of DOD Directive (DODD) 5000.1 in 1971 (Ferrara, 1996, p. 111) established the 
evolutionary development of the series of documents that currently form the foundation 
of a DOD PM’s roles and responsibilities. The documents comprising the DOD 5000 
series are the DODD 5000.01 (written May 12, 2003, and certified current as of 
November 20, 2007) and DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 (January 7, 2015). 
The PM works within the acquisition chain of command in support of the 
operational chain of command, which by design, are separate from one another all the 
way up to the Secretary of Defense. This separation helps to focus PMs on supporting the 
programs they manage in a balanced fashion, concentrating on what would be best for the 
program and its key stakeholders as a whole. If a PM were chosen from an organization 
within the operational chain of command, and subsequently beholden to that chain for 
performance evaluation and career progression, the organization could have an 
unbalanced influence on the development of the program in question. As an example, if 
the PM for a major weapon system were chosen from an Army depot and still 
programmatically and administratively answerable to the depot chain of command, the 
PM may be unreasonably pressured to focus more on the sustainment attributes of the 
system versus the operational capabilities or procurement costs when making trade-offs. 
PMs must consider all stakeholders concerns and work alongside them to successfully 
produce a system. Ensuring that key stakeholders are unable to directly influence the 
PM’s career progression mitigates the risk of unfairly favoring one set of key stakeholder 
concerns and/or requirements over another’s. 
The DOD acquisition chain starts with the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), 
who supervises and is responsible for the entire Defense Acquisition system, and ends 
with the PM responsible for the acquisition and implementation of individual systems 
(Department of Defense, 2015a), as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  DOD Acquisition Authority Chain. Source: U.S. Army War College 
(2015) 
C. PROGRAM MANAGER, TOWED ARTILLERY SYSTEMS 
Program Executive Office Ammunition (PEO Ammo), under the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]) portion 
of the acquisition chain of command, has experienced issues ensuring the success of its 
PMs as life cycle managers. Specifically, PEO Ammo pointed to a perceived 
misalignment between a PM’s responsibilities and funding authority within several of 
their PM offices. The primary example to be examined by this JAP effort is from the PM 
Towed Artillery Systems (TAS), a joint U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)/Army office. PM 
TAS manages the M777A2 system, which is a lightweight, 155-mm howitzer system, 
also known as the LW155. 
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D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
PM TAS, like all PMs under PEO Ammo and most within the Army, has visibility 
and control of their Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) as well as 
Procurement (Other Procurement, Army–OPA) funding via the acquisition chain for all 
phases of the acquisition process up to the Operations and Support (O&S) phase. Once a 
program/system transitions into the O&S phase, the funding for this portion of the life 
cycle (Operations and Maintenance, Army–OMA) is no longer controlled by the 
acquisition chain but instead is controlled by the operational chain of command. In this 
case, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) controls the OMA funding for Army 
programs transitioning into the O&S phase.   
The consolidation of OMA funding requests for all of the systems supporting the 
Army creates a loss of fidelity into any specific system’s funding requirements at the 
AMC level. Therefore, the PM has reduced visibility into the O&S funding for his or her 
particular system because of this lack of funding detail at AMC. This lack of visibility 
and control over the system funding is cited as a major obstacle by the PM in 
implementation of a best-value support strategy for the LW155 system within this phase 
of the acquisition life cycle. 
E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order to find the root cause of PM TAS’s, and by extension, PEO 
Ammunition’s, difficulty in maintaining programmatic control during the O&S phase, we 
must address the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
With the transition to O&S, do current Army policies and processes allow PM 
TAS to effectively manage the LW155 system in accordance with the PM responsibilities 
outlined in the DOD 5000 series documents? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 What is an Army PM’s role and responsibilities within the O&S phase of 
system’s life cycle? 
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 Are PM TAS and PEO Ammo, by extension, following current Army and 
DOD policy? 
 What gaps, if any, exist within Army or DOD policy that fail to cover key 
aspects of PM’s role and responsibilities within the O&S phase of a 
system’s life cycle? 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This project investigated an Army PM’s efforts in transitioning a system from the 
end of the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase into the Operations and Support 
phase, mapping his or her actions to the respective Army and DOD policy/regulation. 
Specifically, we focused on PM TAS’s transition of the LW155 into the O&S phase. We 
identified the planning and actions leading to the LW155’s transition into O&S through a 
comprehensive analysis of their Supportability Strategy and intra-service Memorandum 
of Agreement (MOA). We then took a detailed accounting of the LW155’s processes and 
compared them against the DOD 5000 series documents, the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, the Joint Program Managers Handbook, the Product Support Managers 
Guidebook, the Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, Army regulations/pamphlets and policy memorandums. Our 
methodology concludes with recommendations for changes and clarifications to policy, 
as appropriate. 
G. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This research report contains five chapters. The next chapter provides an 
overview of the DOD and Army policies and guidance applicable to PMs, armed service 
logistics commands, key personnel, and system operator communities during the O&S 
phase. In Chapter III, the authors provide a background of PM TAS and outline the 
planning and actions taken by PM TAS and AMC as the LW155 system transitioned into 
the O&S phase. Chapter IV identifies and analyzes the findings from the previous two 
chapters, highlighting any misalignment of authority and accountability. Finally, the last 
chapter describes the conclusions and recommended courses of actions. 
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H. SUMMARY  
This chapter provided a summary of a PM’s role, responsibilities, and source of 
authority. Additionally, this initial chapter provided an overview of the DOD acquisition 
process, the acquisition chain of command, an introduction to PM TAS, and 
identification of the research questions central to this JAP. Finally, this chapter 
articulated the methodology used in analyzing the problem. In the following chapter, we 
review the policies and procedures the DOD and Army have set forth for the management 
of these programs. 
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II. POLICY ON PM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION POLICY AND 
GUIDELINES 
The purpose of the Defense Acquisition System is to “to manage the nation’s 
investments in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the 
National Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces” (Department of 
Defense, 2003, p. 5). In order to facilitate the management of the full spectrum of 
potential programs needed by DOD, programs are classified into specific Acquisition 
Categories (ACAT) and type. The ACAT level is primarily based on the dollar value of 
the program and its criticality. The type designation for a program is determined by the 
kind of system the program is focused on developing, and its intended use. Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) are typically weapon systems, whereas Major 
Automated Information Systems (MAIS) are typically not weapon systems. A brief 




Figure 3.  ACAT Designation Chart. Source: Department of Defense (2015a) 
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B. ACQUISITION CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) outlines the roles and responsibilities of the acquisition chain of 
command within DOD Instruction 5000.02 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System.” The following is a summary of the acquisition positions in DODI 5000.02 
relevant to this research: 
1. Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
The USD(AT&L) serves as the DAE, retaining the final authority and 
responsibility for all DOD acquisition matters, deferring only to the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF). 
2.  Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) 
The DOD acquisition chain continues with the CAE, which is sometimes referred 
to as the service acquisition executives (SAE). Each branch of the armed services has a 
designated SAE, and within the Army, this position is referred to as the Army 
Acquisition Executive (AAE). The ASA(ALT) serves as the AAE. 
3. Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
The DAE, through the CAE portion of the acquisition chain of command, will 
normally assign or delegate the assignment of oversight for specific programs based on 
that program’s ACAT level and type. The MDA is empowered with the execution of this 
oversight. The ACAT and program type dictate the level of scrutiny placed on the 
management and documentation detail required in order to support the execution of 
programmatic decisions by the respective MDA. The MDA’s responsibilities include 
 Approving program transition from one phase of the acquisition process to 
another. 
 Overseeing the program’s cost, performance, and schedule. 
4. Program Executive Officer (PEO) 
Because of their high dollar value and/or their criticality, ACAT I programs as 
well as any sensitive classified programs are typically assigned by CAEs to a PEO. PEOs 
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are dedicated executive management organizations with no other command 
responsibilities beyond their assigned programs, routinely making them ideal candidates 
to apply the required amount of rigor and oversight to these acquisition programs. 
Additionally, a DOD acquisition program under a PEO’s management may only be 
transferred to a military service’s operational, logistics, or materiel command after “the 
program or increment of capability has passed Initial Operational Capability and has been 
approved for Full-Rate Production or Full Deployment” (Department of Defense, 2015a, 
pp. 73–74). PEOs will often manage several programs through separate PMs. 
PEO Ammunition is the specific PEO office that we are concerned with for this 
research. PM TAS is one of PEO Ammunition’s subordinate PMs under this acquisition 
chain of command. 
5. Program Manager (PM) 
The Army distinguishes between program managers in a manner unique among 
the armed services. An official charter will typically designate an Army PM as a program 
manager, a project manager, or product manager (U.S. Army War College, 2015, pp. 10–
32 to 10–33). The distinction between these three PM titles is based on the dollar value 
and criticality of the program they manage, from most costly/critical to least, 
respectively. DOD Directive 5000.01 and the Manual for the Operation of the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) provide guidance on a PM’s 
life cycle authority. One such passage explains that “the PM shall be the single point of 
accountability for accomplishing program objectives for total life cycle systems 
management, including sustainment” (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 10 enclosure 1), 
and another  describes life cycle management as “the implementation, management, and 
oversight by the PM of all activities associated with the acquisition, development, 
production, fielding, sustaining, and disposal of a DOD system” (Department of Defense, 
2015b, pp. D-D-1). Collectively, these directives and manuals, alongside DODI 5000.02, 
clearly show that from a DOD perspective, the PM under an acquisition chain of 
command is responsible for not only the development and deployment of a system but 
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also the continued programmatic oversight of that system into and throughout O&S. The 
PM’s primary responsibilities, of interest to this report, are 
 Managing the cost, performance, and schedule of assigned program. 
 Developing Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs). 
 Establishing and managing Performance-Based Product Support Strategies 
(PBPSSs), as the Materiel Developer (MATDEV). 
 Identifying, mitigating, and managing program risks throughout the life of 
a program. 
 Leading the development and implementation of a Systems Engineering 
approach across a system’s entire life cycle. 
 Leading Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) comprised of key stakeholders 
towards the success of assigned programs. 
 Assigning a Product Support Manager (PSM) for each ACAT program, in 
coordination with the PEO. (Department of the Army, 2014a, pp. 5–11) 
The subject of this JAP, the Program Manager Towed Artillery Systems office, 
falls under this acquisition chain of command. PM TAS manages several acquisition 
programs to include the LW155, ACAT II program (ASA[ALT], 2016, p. 254). 
6. Product Support Manager (PSM) 
Depending on the size, complexity, and criticality of a program, a PM may 
delegate life cycle support planning and execution oversight to a PSM. In an effort to 
mitigate the risks and associated impacts from ACAT I and II programs, the FY10 
National Defense Authorization Act required the assignment of a PSM to these programs 
under Section 805 (NDAA – Public Law 111–84). In addition to the NDAA, the roles 
and responsibilities of the PSM are defined in detail within the 2016 Product Support 
Manager Handbook (Department of Defense, 2016). The authors extracted the following 
responsibilities from this year’s PMS Guidebook: 
 Developing, implementing, and managing a comprehensive product 
support strategy, also referred to as Performance-Based Product Support 
Strategies (PBPSS), throughout the system life cycle. 
 Maximizing competition, to include small business participation. 
 Developing, implementing, and managing Performance-Based 
Arrangements (PBAs), which are sometimes referred to as Product 
Support Arrangements (PSAs), in support of the PBPSS. 
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 Utilizing applicable tools and analyses to improve a system’s reliability, 
availability, and O&S cost. 
 Developing a plan for the preservations, storage, and/or disposal of all 
production equipment as required. 
 Identifying obsolete system components and developing a mechanism for 
obtaining suitable replacements. 
 Revalidating business-case analyses prior to a change in the PBPSS, or no 
later than every five years. 
 Validating the PBPSS by conducting periodic cost-benefit analyses. 
(Department of Defense, 2016, p. 7) 
7. Product Support Provider (PSP) 
The PSP is responsible for achieving goals supporting the LCSP by meeting 
performance-based metrics. The PSP can be either a governmental organization, such as 
an Army depot, or a private defense contractor. If the PSP is an organic (governmental) 
organization, such as the Army Materiel Command, then memorandums of agreement 
(MOAs) or memorandums of understanding (MOUs) will typically be used by the PM to 
establish the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders, as it pertains to the LCSP 
scope. If the PSP is a contractor, then a legal arrangement, such as a contract or task 
order, is typically used by the PM in order to secure the support necessary to obtain the 
goals outlined in the LCSP (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 25). These legal 
arrangements are referred to most commonly within DOD and Army policy as 
performance-based arrangements (PBAs) or product support arrangements (PSAs) 
(Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 22). 
C. OPERATIONAL ARMY CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The Army operational chain of command represents the U.S. Army’s portion of 
the Warfighters who execute the missions directed by the president of the United States, 
as commander-in-chief. The following sections identify the principle commands within 
the Army (Figure 4)  
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1. Army Command (ACOM) 
An ACOM is an Army force, designated by the SECARMY, performing 
multiple Army Service Title 10 functions (3013b) across multiple 
disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the 
SECARMY. The three ACOMs are as follows (a)  TRADOC, Joint Base 
Langley-Eustis, VA. (b)  AMC, Huntsville, AL. (c)  U.S. Army Forces 
Command (FORSCOM), Fort Bragg, NC.  (U.S. Army War College, 
2015, pp. 4–8) 
a. Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
The U.S. Army Materiel Command is the Army’s premier provider of 
materiel readiness—technology, acquisition support, materiel 
development, logistics power projection, and sustainment—to the total 
force, across the spectrum of joint military operations. The command’s 
complex missions range from development of sophisticated weapons 
systems and cutting-edge research, to maintenance and distribution of 
spare parts. AMC operates the research, development and engineering 
centers; Army Research Laboratory; depots, arsenals and ammunition 
plants; and maintains the Army’s Prepositioned Stocks, both on land and 
afloat. (U.S. Army Materiel Command, 2016, p. 1) 
AMC has four Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMC) that serve as the 
Army’s PSP for organic (Army) depot and supply chain product support (Department of 
the Army, 2014b, p. 22). These LCMCs, although under the operational chain of 
command, are a hybrid combination of AMC subordinate commands and ASA(ALT) 
PEO offices from the acquisition chain of command. LCMCs began to form in 2004 with 
the intent of bringing the acquisition, logistics, and technology communities together to 
better support the Warfighter under a single manager, referred to as a “trail boss,” for 
specific systems (U.S. Army War College, 2015, pp. 10–61). The current LCMCs are 
 Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) 
 Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) 
 Joint Munitions and Lethality (JM&L) 
 Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) 
b. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
TRADOC is the Army’s designated representative for Warfighter capability 
development with several areas of focus including recruiting and training Soldiers, 
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professionally developing military and civilian leaders, developing and guiding the 
evolution of Army doctrine, and utilizing materiel, force structure, and capabilities to 
mold the Army (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2016). 
c. Forces Command (FORSCOM) 
The U.S. Army Forces Command is an organization composed of Active, 
Reserve, and National Guard Soldiers. FORSCOM is the largest Army command and 
provides forces to regionally focused Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in order to 
support a wide-range of military missions (United States Army Forces Command, n.d.). 
2. Army Service Component Command (ASCC) 
An ASCC is a regionally aligned organization, with a primary focus of supporting 
COCOMs in the execution of their missions (U.S. Army War College, 2015, pp. 4–8). 
3. Direct Report Unit (DRU) 
An Army DRU is a specialized organization, which provides a range of unique 
support services to other Army units while being accountable only to the Secretary of the 
Army or a designated representative (U.S. Army War College, 2015, pp. 4–7). 
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Figure 4.  Operational Army Chain of Command. Source: U.S. Army (2016) 
D. PM ACTIONS DURING LATE P&D PHASE 
Current DOD and Department of the Army (DA) policy and guidance outline a 
roadmap for PMs to transition a system from the P&D phase to the O&S phase of the 
defense acquisition process. Even though the P&D and O&S phases are distinct stages of 
the acquisition process with their own scopes and milestones, there is typically 
chronological overlap between the two with the O&S phase starting prior to the 
completion of the P&D phase. 
1. Low-Rate Initial Production / Limited Deployment (LRIP / LD) 
After Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), or Limited Deployment (LD), 
depending on whether the program in question is predominantly a weapon system or AIS, 
the PM will work closely with operational (ASCC) and sustainment (ACOM & DRU) 
communities to successfully complete Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). During 
this portion of the P&D phase, the PM will focus on the manufacturing and deployment 
actions, ensuring that they are proceeding as planned or adjusting the appropriate 
engineering, implementation, or operational considerations as needed. The PM must 
ensure that communications and collaborations across the program IPT are timely and 
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effective in not only addressing programmatic issues but also in identifying and 
addressing concerns from the operational chain of command stakeholders (e.g., ACOMs, 
ASCCs, and DRUs). In particular, OT&E issues related to system capabilities and 
supportability are critical items of concern for the PM. With the successful completion of 
OT&E, the MDA’s approval for the start of Full-Rate Production (FRP)/Full Deployment 
(FD) can be sought. 
a. Funding from Program Inception 
As a program starts to undergo LRIP/LD, it presents the PM an opportunity to 
transition from utilizing primarily RDT&E funding to procurement funding (U.S. Army 
War College, 2015, pp. 10–49). Up to this point in the program acquisition process, 
completion of milestones and entry into the P&D phase, the scope has most likely been 
exclusively one that necessitated RDT&E funding. Depending on the production quantity 
and costs, or level of deployment and associated costs for AIS, a case could be made for 
the use of either RDT&E or procurement funds. Both RDT&E and procurement funds are 
typically provided to the PM via the acquisition chain of command, affording the PM a 
fair measure of visibility and control. 
b. Policy / Guidance (from Program Inception) 
“Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 10–015 – Requirements for Life Cycle 
Management and Product Support” (Change 3, January 16, 2013) mandates the 
assignment of a PSM for all ACAT I and ACAT II programs. This memorandum and the 
associated references within it outline the scope of a PSM leading up to this point in the 
acquisition life cycle with regard to preparing for a successful product support transition 
from P&D to O&S. 
DODI 5000.02 mandates the development of an LCSP starting at Milestone A, 
Figure 5 (Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 114). The LCSP outlines the methodology 
and resources required for the successful implementation of the PBPSS. As the system in 
question evolves during its life cycle, so must the LCSP be updated to reflect any 
required shift in the support strategy (USD[AT&L], 2013). The LCSP, as a living 
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document, would be updated during this phase of the acquisition process to reflect any 
lessons learned from the execution and completion of LRIP/LD and OT&E. 
The “Weapon System Resource Transition to Sustainment Guidance” ASA(ALT) 
memorandum, dated April 5, 2012, mandates the development and submission of a 
concept plan to ASA(ALT) by all Army PMs no later than two years prior to the end of 
production. The purpose of this concept plan is for the PMs to outline and obtain 
concurrence for their personnel reduction approach as they transition from P&D to O&S. 
The “Concept Plan Guidance” DA memorandum, dated March 31, 2010, provides 
guidance on how to develop and submit a concept plan. This guidance is used in 
conjunction with the previously mentioned ASA(ALT) memorandum to plan for and seek 
the approval of required personnel changes for the successful transition into and 
execution of a system’s O&S phase. 
Army Regulation 71–32, Force Development and Documentation mandates 
policies and outlines responsibilities for the documentation and development of force 




Figure 5.  LCSP Evolution. Source: Defense Acquisition University (2016) 
2. Full-Rate Production / Full Deployment (FRP / FD) 
Prior to the fielding of system capabilities to the operational community, whether 
this occurs during LRIP/LD or during FRP/FD, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) must 
be reached. IOC is declared by the operational authority when the community that is to 
utilize the new system has been properly resourced and trained to operationally support it 
(Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 28). Completion of this milestone, IOC, usually 
signals the start of the O&S phase. 
a. Funding 
Whereas with LRIP/LD, RDT&E or procurement funding could be used 
depending on the intent of the LRIP/LD systems, with FRP/FD, it is unlikely that 
anything other than procurement (OPA) funding can be used (U.S. Army War College, 
2015, pp. 10–49). Due to this loss of funding flexibility, PMs must ensure they maintain a 
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current and accurate estimation of the funding types and quantities that they will require 
for the remainder of the program. As the program transitions from LRIP/LD to FRP/FD, 
any lessons learned and programmatic adjustments brought about by this shift need to be 
evaluated for potential impact on the PBPSS. Since the LCSP documents the PBPSS, 
changes to the PBPSS also need to be reflected in the LCSP (Department of the Army, 
2014a, p. 11). Any required changes to the LCSP scope and funding need to be 
documented and staffed for MDA approval as soon as possible, due to the proximity of 
the O&S phase at this point. If any changes to the LCSP occur after FRP/FD, they must 
be approved by the CAE (USD[AT&L], 2013, p. 9). The procurement funding necessary 
for FRP/PD would typically continue to be provided to the PM via the acquisition chain 
of command, ensuring the PM a reasonable measure of visibility and control. 
b. Policy / Guidance 
DODI 5000.02 mandates that the PM demonstrate “control of the manufacturing 
process, acceptable performance and reliability, and the establishment of adequate 
sustainment and support systems” (Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 29) prior to 
obtaining MDA concurrence to move forward with FRP/FD. 
E. PM ACTIONS DURING EARLY O&S PHASE 
The O&S phase starts upon the successful MDA approval of production/
deployment, MDA approval of the LCSP, and the declaration of IOC by the operational 
authority. From this point forward, the PM transitions the physical and day-to-day control 
of the system to the operational chain of command (i.e., Warfighter) along with the LCSP 
as the principle document governing the sustainment of the system in question 
(Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 115). The PM maintains programmatic responsibility 
for the system within the O&S phase, despite not having physical or operational control 
of the respective system. The PM works with the operational chain of command 
throughout the system’s migration through the O&S phase to assess whether the fielded 
system continues to provide the needed capability in an effective and sustainable manner, 
updating the LCSP and any remaining production/deployment as needed (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2016, p. 4.2.7). 
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Throughout the O&S phase, PMs also have the responsibility of managing the 
evolution of system requirements, whether the changes dictate engineering change 
requests for immediate implementation or incorporation into future system refresh or 
modernization planning cycles. Supporting these planning actions and the corresponding 
decision making process, PMs must develop appropriate cost estimates and impact 
analyses. In addition to the aforementioned items, the O&S performance of a PM is 
measured on the system’s ability to achieve the long-term affordability goals set within 
the LCSP (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 99). 
1. Sustainment Tools 
The Army has developed a “program report card,” which utilizes a sustainment 
quad chart, as shown in Figure 6, to aid a PM in the execution of his or her role and 
responsibilities within the O&S phase (Department of the Army, 2014b, pp. 99–100).  
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Figure 6.  Sample Sustainment Quad Chart. Source: Department of the Army 
(2014b) 
a. Product Support Strategy 
The PM and PSM must actively work with the PSP in order to identify issues and 
solutions to the currently implemented LCSP. They also must continue to adjust the 
sustainment plan in order to correct issues, and adapt the plan for the operational use of 
the system in question (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 100). The execution of this 
sustainment plan, LCSP, is the focus of this JAP. Any gap between the planned LCSP 
and the actual sustainment requirements and support actions executed during O&S 
directly reflect on the PM/PSM. When the PSP, in this case AMC, only funds a portion of 
the LCSP, any shortfalls in the required support are directly attributed to both AMC and 
the PM.   
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b. Schedule for Sustainment 
This schedule is produced by the PM to assure that any critical milestones are 
identified and tracked. An example of this would be PBL contract start and end dates. 
This tracking will drive the team to be proactive on updating the LCSP and revising any 
contract documents required in order to have an uninterrupted sustainment strategy.   
c. Goal-focused Metrics 
The metrics are arguably the most important part of this report card. They are 
typically subdivided into availability and O&S cost categories. The PM would be held 
accountable should the system fail to comply with the required operational availability, 
reliability, and/or to be within the expected life cycle cost estimates. In this case, it would 
imply that there is a failure in the PM’s LCSP, an unidentified defect, or some design 
flaw in the system (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 100). The metrics shown on the 
chart are useful in reflecting the status of the system, although they do not indicate how 
this status was obtained.   
2. Funding 
As the PM transitions the system to the operational community, OMA funding 
becomes the primary means of maintaining the system from that point forward. This 
OMA funding is typically used for most aspects of the sustainment support from 
unserviceable hardware replacement, to implementing security patches on software, to 
paying for the labor required to take these and other required actions. Similar to how PMs 
lose operational control of the system going into O&S, they also start to lose financial 
control of the system as procurement funding for the system is expended and the system’s 
future becomes more dependent on the operations and maintenance funding, which is not 
controlled by the PM. Within the Army, AMC and their LCMCs control the OMA 
funding for programs that transition into the O&S phase as the product support providers 
(PSPs) (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 22). Despite the fact that the LCSP outlines 
the optimal level of funding support during this phase of the system life cycle, AMC can 
reprioritize portions of a system’s expected OMA funding. 
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3. Policy / Guidance 
 Army Regulation 70–1, dated July 22, 2011, implements the DOD 5000 
series acquisition policies and guidance into the Army structure. 
Specifically, this AR addresses ACAT I through III programs under the 
Army’s purview. 
 Army Regulation 750–1, dated September 12, 2013, establishes Army 
policies and assigns responsibilities for the execution and management of 
materiel. The scope of materiel maintenance functions covered under this 
AR includes both “field” and “sustainment” actions, also referred to as 
operator and depot operations respectively.  
 Army Regulation700-127, dated October 7, 2014, provides Army policy 
and assigns responsibilities for the development and implementation of 
Performance-Based Product Support Strategies (PBPSSs). 
 Department of the Army Pamphlet 700–127, dated October 8, 2014, 
provides guidance and additional implementation support to the AR 700–
127 with respect to the execution of PBPSS. 
F. SUMMARY  
This chapter provided a summary of a PM’s roles, responsibilities, chain of 
command, and actions as a program transitions from P&D to O&S. Additionally, this 
chapter identified the inheritance of authority for PMs supporting the Army from the 
DOD 5000 series and supporting policy/guidance documents. This chapter also touched 
on Army-specific distinctions for PMs as well as provided an overview of the typical 
types of funding used to support a program during its migration from P&D to O&S. 
Finally, this chapter introduced some of the key stakeholders, an overview of their roles 
and responsibilities, and the basis for their authority in current policy. In the following 
chapter, we discuss the specific actions taken by PM TAS as they transitioned the LW155 
system into the O&S phase. 
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III. PM TAS, O&S ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. FORMATION OF PROJECT MANAGER, TOWED ARTILLERY 
SYSTEMS (1995–2015) 
In 1995, after several years of parallel and independent research, the Navy and the 
Army established a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) to develop the next 
generation of lightweight howitzer. A major component of this next generation of 
howitzer is a digital fire control system, Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD), which aids 
in target acquisition by enabling self-location and electronic aiming. The development of 
this TAD system was originally a separately managed effort that was eventually 
integrated into the JPMO’s scope. The JPMO office was operated under the Marine 
Corps and was augmented by both active duty and civilian Army and Marine Corps 
personnel. Funding support for the program and JPMO office was also divided between 
the two services.   
In 2005, the MOA for the joint office was updated to reflect the impending shift 
to full rate production of the Light Weight 155mm Howitzer (LW155) system, as well as 
the combination of the individual service efforts into a single program. (Bolton & Young, 
2005)  The U.S. Army Acquisition Executive, Malcolm O’Neill, approved the renaming 
of LW155 to PM TAS in January 2011 and provided the joint PM TAS office space at 
Picatinny Arsenal New Jersey. PM TAS was positioned under PEO Ammo, which acted 
as the lead contracting agency for the program from this point forward. In the second 
quarter of FY14, the final M-777 Howitzer was delivered and the program transitioned to 
the O&S phase (ASA[ALT], 2016, p. 254). 
B. THE CURRENT SITUATION FOR THE PM TAS OFFICE (2015-
CURRENT)  
Presently, the PM TAS office is in a transition period, where the final weapon 
system has been delivered and the focus of the office is transitioning to support O&S 
fulltime. This transition is both a funding as well as a programmatic evolution for the 
office.  
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Primarily funded by RDT&E funding during the engineering and manufacturing 
development (E&MD) phase and OPA funding during the production and deployment 
(P&D) phase, the program is now transitioning to an OMA funded office supporting the 
O&S phase of the LW155 system. As the office transitions out of the P&D phase, the 
services are transitioning the joint office’s governmental personnel support. This was 
being done in accordance with the ASA(ALT) memorandum titled “Weapon System 
Resource Transition to Sustainment Guidance” in order to support the O&S phase (Shyu, 
2012). See Table 1 for the configuration of the Army portion of the PM TAS office, 
which includes the key position of PSM that plays a critical role during the O&S phase. 
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Table 1.   PM TAS Authorized Personnel. Source: Department of Defense  
(2015c) 
LN TITLE GRADE POSCO 
01 DPM TAS 04 00340 
02 APM ARTY MOD AE13A039A O3 51A00 
03 OPS & PLANS OFFICER 04 00301 
04 ACQUISITION OFFICER 03 00301 
05 PSM 04 00346 
06 MGMT ANALYST 03 00343 
07 GENERAL ENGINEER 03 00801 
08 BUS MGMT SPEC 03 01101 





11 EQUIPMENT SPECIALIST 13 01670 
12 VISUAL INFO SPEC 08 01084 
13 RESOURCE MGMT SPEC 04 00301 
14 GENERAL ENGINEER 04 00801 
01 SYS PROJ ENGR 13 00801 
02 PROGRAM ANALYST 04 00343 
03 GENERAL ENGINEER 04 00801 
04 CONFIG MGMT SPEC 13 00301 





07 SYSTEMS ENGR 13 00801 
08 SYSTEMS PROJECT ENGR 13 00801 
09 GENERAL ENGINEER 13 00801 
10 MECHANICAL ENGR 13 00830 
11 OPERATIONS RSCH ANALY 13 01515 
12 QUAL ASSUR/TEST ANALY 13 01910 
13 FIELDING LIAISON OFCR 12 00301 
14 GENERAL ENGR 12 00801 
15 MECHANICAL ENGR 13 00830 
16 ENGINEERING TECH 08 00802 
17 PROGRAM ANALYST 13 00343 
18 PROGRAM ANALYST 11 00343 
19 PROGRAM COORDINATOR 12 01102 
20 MECHANICAL ENGR 12 00830 
21 MECHANICAL ENGR 13 00830 
22 LOGISTICS SPEC 13 00346 
23 GENERAL ENGINEER 12 00801 
24 GENERAL ENGINEER 13 00801 
25 MANAGEMENT ANALYST 12 00343 




In order to receive funding for the positions within the PM TAS office, the table 
of distributions and allowances (TDA) must have the positions authorized and funded. 
Army guidance is that all PM offices transition their TDA as they enter O&S due to an 
anticipated decline in personnel requirements. This transition process is described in the 
“Weapon System Resource Transition to Sustainment Guidance” memorandum by 
ASA(ALT) dated April 5, 2012 (Shyu, 2012). The PM TAS office properly developed a 
concept plan that describes the required composition of the office as the program 
transitioned into O&S, the justifications for each of the positions, and submitted it in 
accordance with the timeline described in the “Concept Plan Guidance” memorandum 
dated March 31, 2010 (Thurman, 2010). PM TAS’s concept plan was approved late due 
to the time required to vet the authorization through the process described in AR 71–32, 
Force Development and Documentation (Department of the Army, 2013a). Although the 
PM office submitted the request for change to their TDA authorization in a timely 
fashion, other agencies responsible for processing these changes took longer than 
expected. As a result, the authorizations occurred mid-FY16 rather than at the beginning 
of FY16.   
At the onset of this research project, it appeared that the Army was not funding 
these positions, because of this delayed approval. This prolonged approval process 
resulted in a situation where the PM TAS office was being staffed with Army personnel 
that were not being funded by the Army, but instead were being funded by the Marine 
Corps. This was not boding well with the Marine Corps Program Manager, who despite 
desiring to maintain the joint office in order to continue supporting of the entire LW155 
howitzer community, knew that paying for both the Marine Corps and Army personnel 
from just one service was unsustainable. Fortunately, the Army finally approved the 
concept plan and funding received for the Army personnel.  
As the office shifts to the O&S phase of its life cycle, PM TAS updated the 
Supportability Strategy for the LW155 system to a combination of government support and a 
Performance-Based Life Cycle Support (PBLCS) contract for system repair parts. The Army 
is fulfilling the contract portion of the agreement by funding it via AMC, but at reduced 
levels set by the AMC funding managers (U.S. Army Audit Agency, 2015, p. 12).   
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C. FUTURE OF PM TAS AND LW155 O&S (2016+) 
With the lack of initial funding support from the Army for PM TAS’s original 
O&S set of governmental responsibilities, this period of transition was difficult at best. 
The PM TAS office has appropriately realigned their TDA staffing in order to meet 
mission requirements during the sustainment phase. The Army will continue to fund the 
sustainment contracts via AMC, however the concern of how much control the PM TAS 
office has over the actual O&S that the Army performs on the LW155 is the primary 
issue. AMC is tasked with funding and executing the O&S activities, while the PM TAS 
office has limited visibility into these actions. 
D. PM TAS SUSTAINMENT PLAN FOR THE LW155 
The PM office produced the required supportability strategy document and has a 
sustainment strategy that will allow the LW155 to maintain system operational readiness. 
This strategy combines both contractor and Army/Marine Corps organic capabilities to 
meet the needs of the weapon system. These supportability and sustainment strategies are 
in accordance with DOD 5000.01 for product support and have been approved by the 
system MDA. This sustainment plan is managed by the PM TAS via the Product Support 
Manager (PSM).   
1. Government Sustainment Responsibilities 
The Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) and the Army’s Tank-
automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) serve as the primary liaison and 
inventory control organizations for the LW155 weapon system. (M777A2 Sustainment 
Strategy, 2014)  In addition, AMC acts as the contract agent for the performance based 
contract in support of the LW155. These high-level entities provide depot level 
maintenance, technical manuals, property control, provisioning as well as training for 
units that are using this weapon system (Gooding, 2014).   
As with all military equipment, maintenance starts with the individual Soldier or 
Marine that is assigned to the howitzer. They perform daily maintenance in accordance 
with the appropriate technical manual. The Army uses preventative maintenance, checks 
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and services (PMCS) in order to assure that the howitzer is operational and maintained 
properly. If one of the checks indicates there is something wrong with the system, such as 
a tire that will not hold air pressure, the PMCS process will provide a solution. In this 
example it would be to add air, recheck after 30 minutes, and if pressure drops 5 psi, 
replace tire. These checks also indicate when the system needs to be inspected by higher-
level maintenance personnel. In this example, the integration of contractors into this 
maintenance process occurs when the contractor provides a new tire and gives technical 
assistance to the higher level maintenance personnel. 
2. Contractor Sustainment Responsibilities 
 Contractors, in this case BAE System, serve as the partner to the organic military 
personnel who provide the sustainment support to keep the LW155 operational. Their 
contracts provide spare parts, delivered from the manufacturer to the end user, provide 
engineering, logistics support and system reliability functions under their performance 
based logistics support contract. The division between government and contractor efforts 
is reflected in Figure 7 and is provided as reference as to how the LW155 is maintained. 
All of the organic and contractor tasks are provided by AMC as the PSP for this system. 
The management of this plan is the responsibility of the PM TAS office and the PSM. 
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Figure 7.  Contractor / Government Sustainment Strategy for the LW155. 
Source: Gooding (2014) 
E. AMC FUNDING METHOD FOR THE LW155 DURING O&S 
The PSM works in coordination with the AMC, field personnel (operational 
units), and other key stakeholders to reduce costs where possible over the life of the 
system (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 16). In accordance with DA Pam 700–127, 
the AMC is the PSP for Army organic depot and supply chain product support 
(Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 22). They receive O&M funds from ASA(FM&C) 
for all of the major weapon systems that are presently in the O&S phase of their life cycle 
within the Army (Department of the Army, 2013c, p. 101). They do not provide or act as 
a PM over these PEO-run programs; rather they act as the PSP to assure that performance 
requirements are met. By regulation, the PSP is responsible for meeting or exceeding the 
performance outcomes required in the performance based arrangements established by 
the PSM (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 22). The challenge is when funds available 
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cannot cover the costs and there is a perception of a loss of control by the PM TAS 
office.    
1. AMC’s Challenge 
As the PSP for multiple weapon systems, AMC must weigh the operational 
readiness of all systems, as well as other factors, when funding the acquisition PM’s 
sustainment plans. This distribution of funds is within the authority of AMC to assure 
that the performance outcomes meet their performance requirements. The inability to 
provide complete funding for the PM TAS sustainment requirements leads to a 
perception of a loss of accountability for the PM TAS office. As an example, if a weapon 
system has an unplanned safety issue, which directly impacts the operational readiness, 
AMC must address this by shifting available funds in order to resolve the issue. Some 
may argue that this is a PM function, but it is not, as AMC is only funding the planned 
O&S required by the PM. They must carefully weigh the options when funding these 
efforts to assure that all weapon systems meet their minimum performance and 
operational availability standards. 
2. AMC’s Method of Funding Sustainment across all of Their Supported 
Systems 
AMC has developed a methodology to identify which system receives the limited 
funding provided for O&S. The sustainment systems technical support (SSTS) funds are 
allocated through a criteria-driven process. Each system supported is compared to the 
others to identify where funding needs to be expended to maintain operational readiness 
thresholds for all of the systems. This process uses four criteria in order to provide a 
weighting for funds. The four are legal, safety, readiness, and area of responsibility. 
These areas are reviewed and a risk analysis is performed to determine the weighting for 




Figure 8.  Criteria Weighting Scale and Importance. Source: Army Material 
Command (2013). 
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AMC solicits information from the PSM’s as well as the operational units and 
safety offices. Through this system, AMC can justify to all concerned that they are 
properly managing the funding provided. Prior to this being implemented, AMC was the 
subject of a U.S. Army Audit Agency review and audit that found that funds were not 
utilized properly and consistently (U.S. Army Audit Agency, 2015, p. 4).    
Once the criteria weighting is established, the process described in Figure 9 is 
followed. Note that the PSM is involved in the criteria, and the PM/PEO offices have 
input into a prioritization list, but the final approval is the LCMC, which is an extension 
of AMC (Army Material Command, 2013). Bottom line, the PM TAS is not in charge of 
prioritizing the funds during O&S, rather it is the AMC, but PM TAS (and all other PMs 
with operational systems) has a voice in the process. 
 
Figure 9.  Current Process for Allocation of Funds for AMC. Source: Army 
Material Command (2013) 
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F. RISK OF NOT FUNDING THE LCMP AS REQUIRED FOR THE LW155 
As the LW155 is supported both by the government and contractor services, there is a 
shared risk in failing to provide the sustainment activities from both sides of the team. The 
PM TAS office has developed and distributed technical manuals for the LW155, better 
known as the M777 series of howitzer. This manual describes the PMCS required to maintain 
and verify that the gun is ready to perform its mission. As an example of reduced availability 
risk, consider the following. In accordance with the PMCS manual, the tires on the M777 are 
required to be checked for wear, tire pressure and overall serviceability. If the Soldier/
operator of the M777 notes that the tire wear is getting to the point of requiring a 
replacement, they will order a new tire. If there are limited funds available, the decision may 
be made at a higher level to not replace the tire, instead waiting for the tire to completely fail 
prior to authorizing a replacement. This may defer this preventative maintenance, but down 
the road, will result in a non-serviceable howitzer when the tire fails due to lack of tread. This 
will then become an operational impact and they will fund the replacement in order to 
maintain operational readiness rates. 
1. Government Failure to Maintain 
 The organic personnel from the military will perform the required maintenance and 
operate the howitzer in accordance with the manuals provided by the PM TAS team. If 
they fail to maintain the gun properly, due to not following the manual, then there will be 
issues with the performance or reliability of the weapon system. As with the example 
provided, it is possible that the lack of maintenance will result in a non-operational 
howitzer. As these Soldiers and Marines are  professionals, generally, the sustainability 
issues associated with the use of a PBLSC will be related to the availability and access to 
spare parts and contractor provided technical assistance.  
2. Contractor Failure to Maintain 
At some point, a part will fail or wear out, and a new part will be ordered. 
Depending on the part, the howitzer may become non-operational, which means it cannot 
perform its mission of accurately engaging targets. As the sustainment plan for this 
system ties contractor provided parts and expertise to the maintenance work performed 
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by the Soldiers and Marines, having a reduced capability can affect the readiness of the 
system. AMC, in managing the funds provided to them for this effort, can potentially 
degrade the readiness of the system by underfunding these contracts. The remedy for this 
is to add funds to these contracts in an emergency fashion, which will burden other AMC 
programs, or will require a request for additional funds. As this is being processed, there 
is the potential that the system could become non-operational and impact combat 
readiness and mission accomplishment.   
3.       Product Support Managers Role in Monitoring Risk 
In accordance with DA PAM 700–127 paragraph 3–17, the PSM is responsible 
for continually updating the support strategy to reduce the cost of the effort (Department 
of the Army, 2014b, p. 17). They perform this effort by collecting data from the field to 
determine shortfalls and overages in their plan. They must work closely with the AMC in 
order to assure that any support shortages do not drop the readiness rate for the weapon 
system.   
AMC can manage this by setting up the PBL contract in a manner to allow for 
cost growth during the period of performance. They then would confer closely with the 
contractor and the PSM to verify that the required sustainment efforts are being 
performed. The PSM can then recommend adjustments to the contract or the maintenance 
requirements of the contract (Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 17). 
It appears that this process is presently working with the LW155 as the system 
was maintaining the required readiness rates (Gooding, 2014). Caution is warranted 
though, as it has been only a few years with AMC controlling the contract funds. A future 
review of the performance should be conducted to measure the effectiveness of AMC’s 
management of funds. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief history of the PM TAS office including the 
transition into the O&S phase of the LW155 system. It also provided insight into the 
current AMC processes that pertain to funding of the LW155 system for its operational 
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life. Finally, it described the method in which AMC provides funding to the weapon 
systems that it is tasked with maintaining. Chapter IV discusses the analysis and findings 
as focused on the primary and secondary research questions. 
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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
The first step taken was to review the DOD and Army policies outlined in Chapter 
II with the documents and information provided by the PM TAS office in order to 
determine compliance. From review of the documents provided, the PM TAS office 
complied with all aspects of the DOD and Army Requirements (Table 2). 




In the review of the organization and structure of the PM TAS office, it had the 
correct combination of personnel, to include the PSM. Additionally, a review of AMC’s 
method of managing the funds provided to execute the O&S contracts and government 
efforts was performed. Again, it was found that AMC is executing their processes as 
required by regulation. This validation was found in the previously mentioned Army 
audit of the funds management and the aforementioned implementation of the funds 
management process. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the transition to O&S, do current Army policies and processes allow PM 
TAS to effectively manage the LW155 system in accordance with the PM responsibilities 
outlined in the DOD 5000 series? 
Although the operational readiness state of the LW155 howitzer system presently 
exceeds the system readiness requirement of 90% for the weapon system, the PM TAS 
office is encountering difficulty in managing the O&S of the system (Department of the 
Army, 2013b, pp. II-2). This is a direct result of their inability to direct the allocation of 
funds to their sustainment plan. In accordance with AR 700–125 and DA PAM 700–125, 
the Army is performing the required O&S based upon the performance based product 
support strategy (PBPSS) (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 6). Although the AMC is 
providing the appropriate funding to maintain the level of performance and operational 
readiness of the LW155 system, they are not funding the sustainment plan to the level 
recommended by PM TAS. Provided the system is being operated in a manner that was 
anticipated when the LCSP was developed, this lack of funding has the potential to 
eventually lead to failures due to deferred, delayed, or not accomplished maintenance 
and/or inspections.    
Due to AMC’s method of managing the funding provided for sustainment of their 
assigned systems, the PMs for all of the systems being sustained by AMC, including the 
LW155, have only limited visibility of the funds available to execute the sustainment 
strategies for their respective programs. This is presently an effective way for AMC to 
manage the funds available across all systems, but does not provide PM TAS, or other 
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PMs within the PEO Ammo organization, with full confidence that their sustainment plan 
will be executed as required. As shown, AMC is responsible for implementing the 
sustainment for this weapon system, making the final funding decisions to adequately 
resource the Army’s priorities.   These actions, although in keeping with current DOD 
and DA policy, do hinder PM TAS’s visibility into and ability to manage the LW155’s 
status throughout the O&S phase according to their charter. The PSM can influence the 
process (Figure 9), and does receive feedback from AMC pertaining to operational and 
sustainment issues. They are able to use this data to evaluate their LCSP, however it was 
not clear as to whether data was being provided pertaining to the impacts of the reduced 
funding. 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
What is an Army PM’s role and responsibilities within the O&S phase of 
system’s life cycle? 
The DOD 5000 series of documents serve as the authoritative source for a PM’s 
roles and responsibilities, which are simply summarized as “the single point of 
accountability for accomplishing program objectives for total life cycle systems 
management, including sustainment” (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 10, Enclosure 1). 
Although the Army has specific policy and guidance addressing a PM’s roles and 
responsibilities, these do not contradict nor take away from the foundation laid down by 
the DOD 5000 series.  
Some Army-specific additions of note to the PM’s roles and responsibilities 
include AR 70–1 Army Acquisition Policy paragraph 2–2, which describes the PEO and 
PM’s responsibilities. It identifies the PM as the Material Developer (MATDEV) 
(Department of the Army, 2011, p. 8). It also requires them to “provide the planning 
guidance, direction, control, oversight, and support necessary to ensures systems are … 
minimize life-cycle cost; and ensure systems are supported and fielded within cost, 
schedule, performance, and supportability baselines, providing a coordinated, Army wide 
solution” (Department of the Army, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, it requires them to comply 
with the sustainment requirements in AR 700–127 Integrated Product Support including a 
Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 36). 
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AR 700–127 lists the requirements of the PM office, typically identified as the 
MATDEV as well as the PSM. These duties can be found in Chapter III (Department of 
the Army, 2014a, p. 8). The specific requirements for the operation and sustainment 
phase are outlined in paragraph 3–8. Relevant requirements from this paragraph include 
monitoring of sustainment efforts against metrics and refinement of sustainment plans 
and LCSP based upon performance and evolving operational needs (Department of the 
Army, 2014a, p. 10).  
Are PM TAS and PEO Ammo, by extension, following current Army and 
DOD policy? 
In review of the TDA for the current PM TAS office, it has all of the key 
personnel that the regulations require, including the PM, PSM and support staff. Based 
upon the plan that is currently in place, from a DOD perspective, maintaining a Joint PM 
TAS office is the correct solution. This is based upon the cost savings of having a hybrid 
PBL/Government sustainment program and the fact there is no difference in weapon 
systems fielded between the Army and Marine Corps. The present hybrid process has 
AMC acting as the PSP by providing the PBL contract for both services. This minimizes 
costs and contract administration fees, as there is only one contract as opposed to two.   
Compliance with certain policies, as indicated in Table 2, could not be ascertained 
due to the early stage of the O&S life cycle. An evaluation of these items could not be 
performed; however, we are confident that the PM TAS office and supporting operational 
elements have adequate organization in order to comply with the requirements. There 
was no indication in the documents reviewed that would indicate noncompliance. 
What gaps, if any, exist within Army or DOD policy that fail to cover key 
aspects of PM’s role and responsibilities within the O&S phase of a system’s 
life cycle? 
In the review of the PM TAS office, the primary issue focused on the loss of 
financial control of funds to pay for the PM TAS office personnel, as well as the O&S 
funds being allocated to implement their sustainment strategy. This lack of visibility and 
control is the primary gap discovered during our analysis of the office.   
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1. Gap 1: Personnel Finances 
From our analysis of the personnel funding, it initially appeared that there was a 
gap that pertains to the tracking of the revisions to office staffing. Due to the inability of 
the PM TAS office to track the status of their concept plan for their office transition to 
O&S, the PM TAS office perceived a loss of control due to the lack of authorizations for 
the Army employees. 
In order to receive funding for the positions within the PM TAS office, the TDA 
must have the positions authorized and funded. As noted, the PM TAS office successfully 
submitted a timely request for this TDA change. Army guidance is that all PM offices 
transition their TDA as they enter O&S due to a change in personnel requirements. This 
transition process is described in the “Weapon System Resource Transition to 
Sustainment Guidance” memorandum by ASA(ALT) dated April 5, 2012. The PM TAS 
office properly developed a concept plan that describes the required composition of the 
office as the program transitioned into O&S, the justifications for each of the positions, 
and submitted it in accordance with the timeline described in the “Concept Plan 
Guidance” memorandum dated March 31, 2010. PM TAS’s concept plan was approved 
late due to the time required to vet the authorization through the process described in AR 
71–32 Force Development and Documentation. As a result, the Authorizations occurred 
mid-FY 16 rather than at the beginning of FY16.   
At the onset of this research project, it appeared that the Army was not funding 
these positions, when in fact, they were. This issue resulted in an incorrect perception that 
O&S responsibility was being transferred away from the PM TAS office. Given the 
available information, we believe that PM TAS could have avoided the false perception 
mentioned earlier by being more persistent in their search for a status update. 
2. Gap 2: Management of funds for implementation of O&S. 
The current regulation provides funds for the operation and sustainment on the 
operational side of the Army. AMC is tasked, appropriately so, to assure that the Army’s 
weapon systems are operational and reliable for our Warfighters. The second gap is the 
method that the Army utilizes for funding the operation and sustainment of the system via 
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AMC. As AMC is the PSP for the LW155, they are provided the funds directly in 
accordance with AR 750–1 Army Materiel Maintenance regulation and DOD guidance 
(Department of the Army, 2013c, p. 101).  
In layman’s terms, AMC is given the sustainment requirements by PM TAS, and 
then they execute it. If for some reason there is a funding shortfall, the sustainment 
requirements will be reduced or not performed. The PM TAS office does not have 
visibility of AMC’s funds until they allocate them to the LW155 program; AMC works 
with PM TAS to determine what is required to fund the LCSP and AMC informs them of 
the amount requested each fiscal year.  
Once AMC receives the funds from the OMA appropriation, they fund their 
programs based upon the criteria driven weighting for funds allocation process. Only 
after this is complete does the PM TAS become aware of the funds received.   AMC does 
confer with the PM TAS office on interpretation of the sustainment plan, to prioritize 
what portions are being implemented, but it is ultimately AMC’s decision. Although 
AMC is in compliance as the PSP, they are forced, due to fiscal constraints, to perform a 
management function of identifying what portions of the plan to implement.   
D. SUMMARY  
In this chapter, we analyzed pertinent regulations and policies. We then provided 
answers to the primary and secondary research questions, which leads us into the final 
chapter, where a recommended change is provided.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
Our recommendation is to improve the PM’s ability to successfully maintain 
control of O&S system sustainment by addressing who is accountable for implementation 
of the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) during the O&S phase. 
The LCMC should be accountable for implementing the LCSP. As AMC 
determines what gets funded and what does not, it is only reasonable to place the 
accountability on them rather than the PM offices of the systems they support. This is the 
situation that the PM TAS office is experiencing, as well as other programs under the 
current LCMC configuration. 
As noted, the PM should not be held accountable for the execution of their 
maintenance/life cycle plan for a specific system when they do not control the funds 
required to execute this plan. There is a limit to this position, specifically, if the plan 
provided when fully funded, does not maintain the operational readiness for the system, 
then the PM should be held accountable for a defective sustainment plan. This delineation 
should be in DA PAM 700–127 Integrated Product Support Procedures. To assist the PM 
in determining accountability, additional information that is not presently identified in the 
regulation is required. The PSM must receive detailed information from the LCMC PSP 
as to which sustainment activities are underfunded, as well as the operational use of the 
system. This will allow the PM to analyze the field data to determine if the issue is with 
the plan, or with the funding of the plan. It would also place the accountability for the 
operational readiness of the system directly on the LCMC if the cause of the failure was 
due to not complying with the sustainment requirements set out by the PM. Note that the 
PSM currently reviews the operational use of the system to adjust the LCMP and 
accordingly the cost estimate. 
Suggested revisions to AR 700–127 and DA PAM 700–127 are as follows: 
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1. AR 700–127 Revision 
AR 700–127 outlines the material command’s role during the life cycle of the 
program. Paragraph 1–19 outlines their responsibilities (Department of the Army, 2014a, 
p. 5). A revision to this paragraph would clarify that they, as the PSP are accountable for 
complying with the LCSP for their assigned systems. A new paragraph under 1–19 e 
would state: 
AMC is accountable for the funding and execution of the LCSP after delivery of 
the final item for the system until disposal. Any LCSP not fully implemented must be 
documented with the PSM in order to perform a risk assessment for the system. 
2. DA PAM 700–127 Revision 
For the reader’s clarity of the revision, the following is directly from the pamphlet 
DA PAM 700–127 Integrated Product Support Procedures, with our recommended 
revision in underlined italics. 
3-17 Operations and Support Management  
a. The final Post Production Support Plan (PPSP) is completed prior to 
production phase-out and schedules are established for reviewing and 
updating the PPSP throughout the life cycle. 
b. Following the fielding of all ACAT level materiel, equipment 
performance and readiness data will be gathered through the appropriate 
supporting logistics information systems and at the U.S. Army Materiel 
Command (AMC) Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA), who collects and 
monitors the data not available during developmental and acceptance 
testing. PFSA is a LOGSA tool that can be used to minimize support costs 
and develop either materiel modifications or new materiel with improved 
supportability and reduced life cycle costs. 
c. After the initial fielding to Army units, the PSM plans and executes all 
transition activities identified in the LCSP. One transition may be 
transitioning the support during production to support after production has 
been terminated (this should be reflected in the LCSP). Another transition 
may be the changeover from interim contractor support (ICS) or contractor 
logistics support (CLS) to the objective support identified in the LCSP. All 
transitions need to be planned far enough in advance to ensure that there is 
no interruption in the programming and budgeting functions for life cycle 
support resources. 
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(1)  Upon the transition after production has terminated and CLS 
changeover the LCMC shall be accountable for implementing the 
requirements set forth in the LCSP. The PM is not responsible for the 
operational readiness of the system unless there is a deficiency in the 
LCSP which cause the failure. 
(2) PSM’s will monitor the implementation of the LCSP by the LCMC to 
provide recommendations and refinements based upon actual field data, to 
include funded and unfunded portions identified by the LCMC. The PSM 
will recommend emphasis areas for future funding to the LCMC in order 
to reduce the risk of failure to meet readiness requirements.   
d. The PSM, with the support of the PSMIPT, uses data collected from the 
field readiness and maintenance reporting system and field-training 
exercises for analysis with the objective of continually improving the 
support structure and reducing O&S costs. Efforts will include identifying 
cost drivers due to failure rates that increased costs of replacement parts, 
and performing a Level of Repair Analysis (LORA), as defined in SAE 
AS1390, to validate the established support structure. Automated tools, 
such as the PFSA, can be used to process and analyze the field data 
against specified metrics. LCMC’s will provide detailed reports of funds 
obligated toward the sustainment strategy within 90 days of obligation 
including a risk analysis of items not fully funded. This report will be 
provided to the PSM for comparison to readiness rates from previous 
years in order to provide recommendations to the LCMC. 
e. The PSM collects and evaluates the actual field data against the metrics 
specified in the Performance Based Arrangement (PBA(s)). These data 
and evaluation results will be provided to all PBA stakeholders and 
corrective actions are taken when required. PBAs will be updated as 
required throughout the materiel’s life cycle to reflect revised product 
support strategies in terms of performance-based goals tied to performance 
metrics. 
f. The MATDEV institutes a continual technology refreshment program 
and initiates materiel changes, as necessary, to improve supportability, 
reduce LCC, and decrease the logistics footprint of the materiel. 
g. Refining the planning process assures the continuing sustainment and 
maintenance of materiel and can include the following: 
(1) Life cycle savings through improved O&S methods. 
(2) TI. 
(3) Evolutionary acquisition and preplanned product improvements. 
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(4) Value engineering improvements. 
 (Department of the Army, 2014b, pp. 16–17) 
B. CONCLUSION  
Army PMs have their roles and responsibilities detailed primarily within the DOD 
5000 series of documentation, which state that a PM has responsibility for a system 
throughout its entire life cycle. There is a conflict between the responsibilities, outlined in 
the DOD guidance, and the authority for sustainment execution, represented by the 
sustainment funding allocated to AMC. The execution of this responsibility into the O&S 
phase of the acquisition process is complicated as the Army and user communities 
attempt to comply with Army guidance regarding sustainability responsibilities. This 
phase of the system’s life cycle, where the system in question is exposed to the PM, 
LCMCs, and other operational communities all at the same time, can easily lead to 
conflict over the funding and programmatic control of the system. 
The successful execution of the O&S phase for any system is predicated on the 
collaborative efforts of several key stakeholders. Army, or DOD guidance cannot hope to 
appropriately mitigate the risk of conflicts between these key stakeholders without first 
establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities for not only the PM, but for the 
primary, key stakeholders the PM is expected to interact with throughout the O&S phase. 
The O&S phase, the longest and most expensive phase of a typical system’s life cycle, is 
not a time to introduce such uncertainties and destabilizing power struggles, for not only 
the sake of the system’s total cost but also for the quality of operational support the 
system provides the Warfighter. 
This JAP delved into the specific area concerning the O&S phase of the life cycle 
for the LW155 howitzer and how the PM can maintain control. It was found that although 
the PM is charged with system life cycle sustainment, conflicting guidance to the 
operational side of the Army and the acquisition side has resulted in a struggle between 
the two due to how the funding is managed. Although this process is working, it fogs the 
line of who is really accountable for the readiness of a weapon system once fully fielded. 
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Our recommendation formalizes the accountability and, if adopted would clearly 
delineate who is accountable for the sustainment of these systems during the O&S phase. 
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